90 lines
3.7 KiB
Python
90 lines
3.7 KiB
Python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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"""Verify credential files written by cookie sync helpers and CLI helpers
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are owner-only (0o600) and that values containing shell metacharacters do
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not break the shell-sourceable env file produced by _sync_bird_env().
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Companion to tests/test_config.py::test_save_creates_file_with_restricted_permissions —
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the same threat-model claim ("Cookie/Token only stored locally, 600
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permissions") covers these paths.
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"""
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import json
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import os
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import stat
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import tempfile
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import pytest
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from agent_reach.cookie_extract import _sync_bird_env, _sync_xfetch_session
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def _owner_only(path: str) -> bool:
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mode = os.stat(path).st_mode
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return not (mode & (stat.S_IRGRP | stat.S_IWGRP | stat.S_IROTH | stat.S_IWOTH))
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@pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform == "win32", reason="POSIX perm semantics only")
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def test_sync_xfetch_session_writes_0600(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("HOME", str(tmp_path))
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_sync_xfetch_session("auth_xxx", "ct0_yyy")
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session_path = tmp_path / ".config" / "xfetch" / "session.json"
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assert session_path.exists(), "expected ~/.config/xfetch/session.json"
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assert _owner_only(str(session_path)), "session.json must be 0o600"
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# Round-trip the content so we know we didn't accidentally corrupt JSON.
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data = json.loads(session_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
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assert data["authToken"] == "auth_xxx"
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assert data["ct0"] == "ct0_yyy"
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@pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform == "win32", reason="POSIX perm semantics only")
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def test_sync_bird_env_writes_0600(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("HOME", str(tmp_path))
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_sync_bird_env("auth_xxx", "ct0_yyy")
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env_path = tmp_path / ".config" / "bird" / "credentials.env"
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assert env_path.exists(), "expected ~/.config/bird/credentials.env"
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assert _owner_only(str(env_path)), "credentials.env must be 0o600"
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@pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform == "win32", reason="POSIX sh needed for sourcing")
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def test_sync_bird_env_quotes_shell_metachars(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Tokens containing ", $, `, ; etc. must not break out of the assignment.
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Prior implementation used `f'AUTH_TOKEN="{auth_token}"'` which an attacker-
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controlled cookie containing a literal `"` could break out of, turning a
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later `source ~/.config/bird/credentials.env` into arbitrary shell.
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"""
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monkeypatch.setenv("HOME", str(tmp_path))
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# Side-effect markers live under tmp_path (auto-cleaned by pytest) rather
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# than a shared absolute /tmp path — otherwise one vulnerable run leaves a
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# marker behind that fails every later run on the same machine/CI runner.
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pwn_auth = tmp_path / "pwn-auth"
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pwn_ct0 = tmp_path / "pwn-ct0"
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hostile_auth = f'inj"; touch {pwn_auth}; #'
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hostile_ct0 = f"ct0_$(touch {pwn_ct0})"
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_sync_bird_env(hostile_auth, hostile_ct0)
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env_path = tmp_path / ".config" / "bird" / "credentials.env"
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# Sourcing the file must NOT execute the injected payload. Read back the
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# exported values from a subshell instead — they should equal the originals.
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probe = (
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f". {env_path}; "
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f'printf "AUTH=%s\\nCT0=%s\\n" "$AUTH_TOKEN" "$CT0"'
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)
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result = subprocess.run(
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["sh", "-c", probe],
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capture_output=True,
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text=True,
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timeout=5,
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)
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assert result.returncode == 0, result.stderr
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lines = dict(
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line.split("=", 1) for line in result.stdout.strip().splitlines() if "=" in line
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)
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assert lines["AUTH"] == hostile_auth, "auth_token round-trip broke — injection possible"
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assert lines["CT0"] == hostile_ct0, "ct0 round-trip broke — injection possible"
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# And no side-effect files materialised.
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assert not pwn_auth.exists()
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assert not pwn_ct0.exists()
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